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1Secure Communication Architecture for Dynamic
Energy Management in Smart Grid
Sarmadullah Khan, Rafiullah Khan, and Ali Hilal Al-Bayatti
Abstract—Smart grid takes advantage of communication tech-
nologies for efficient energy management and utilization. It
entails sacrifice from consumers in terms of reducing load
during peak hours by using dynamic energy pricing model. To
enable active participation of consumers in load management,
the concept Home Energy Gateway (HEG) has recently been
proposed in literature. However, the HEG concept is rather new
and literature still lacks to address challenges related to data
representation, seamless discovery, interoperability, security and
privacy. This paper presents the design of a communication
framework that effectively copes with the interoperability and
integration challenges between devices from different manufac-
turers. The proposed communication framework offers seamless
auto-discovery and zero-configuration based networking between
heterogeneous devices at consumer sites. It uses elliptic curve
based security mechanism for protecting consumers privacy and
providing best possible shield against different types of cyber-
attacks. Experiments in real networking environment validated
that the proposed communication framework is lightweight,
secure, portable with low bandwidth requirement and flexible
to be adopted for dynamic energy management in smart grid.
Index Terms—Smart Grid, Dynamic Energy Management,
Utility Services, Universal Plug & Play, Smart Home.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, efficient energy management and utilization is be-
coming increasingly important due to depletion of available
electricity generation resources at an alarming rate [1]. Smart
grid offers not only enormous opportunities for integration of
renewables but also plays a vital role in distributed dynamic
energy management at consumer sites [2]. Emerging smart
grid services require certain sacrifice from consumers in terms
of reducing load at peak demand hours in order to prevent
load-shedding/blackout. This is achieved by using dynamic
energy pricing model based on load forecast [3], [4], [5].
Utilities will offer higher price at peak-hours and lower price
at off-peak hours [6]. To save on electricity bills, consumers
will operate household appliances during off-peak hours.
Dynamic energy management requires an intelligent device
at the consumer sites to enable effective command and con-
trol from the utility. The concept of Home Energy Gateway
(HEG) has recently been proposed in literature for easing the
development of smart grid services such as load management,
home automation, integration of renewables, dynamic energy
pricing, etc [7], [8]. The basic scenario is depicted in Fig. 1.
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The HEG communicates with the utility as well as with house-
hold appliances (e.g., heaters, TV, refrigerator, air-conditioner,
washing machine, etc). It continuously tracks and controls
the operational state of appliances based on user-specified
configurations or real-time commands from the utility.
A. Paper Motivation
This paper addresses three key challenges in the design
of dynamic energy management service in smart grid: (i)
seamless auto-discovery, (ii) interoperability and integration,
and (iii) security and privacy.
Many consumers may not have technical skills to configure
appliances and establish their communication with the HEG.
Future network-enabled household appliances must operate as
plug & paly without requiring any configurations from the
user. Thus, the HEG and appliances need to inherent auto-
discovery feature to enable seamless mutual discovery and
communication as soon as connected to the network.
Household appliances are normally manufactured by dif-
ferent companies using custom protocols and data representa-
tions. This raises interoperability and integration issues due
to lack of a standard communication framework. Thus, a
common communication framework needs to be investigated
and adopted by all manufacturers.
Security and privacy is always a major concern for Internet-
based services. The HEG exchanges sensitive consumer in-
formation with the utility and receives commands to control
household appliances. Any compromise of the HEG commu-
nication could lead to severe consequences such as increased
electricity bill, unmanageable load increase on utility, black-
out, operation of critical appliances at undesirable time, etc.
Thus, a strong security mechanism is utmost necessary to
protect communication from cyber-attacks.
B. Paper Contributions
The HEG (or gateway in general) has been developed
by several researchers in literature focusing on a specific
challenge e.g., auto-discovery [8], [9], interoperability [7], [9],
[10], [11] or security [12], [13]. However, literature still lacks
a comprehensive communication framework that could address
challenges (presented in Section I-A) all together.
This paper investigates and develops a comprehensive com-
munication framework (for the HEG and household appli-
ances) that is equipped with all essential features presented
in Section I-A (seamless auto-discovery, interoperability/in-
tegration and security). It is designed to be light-weight,
highly configurable and flexible enough to be integrated in
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Fig. 1. Distributed dynamic energy management in smart grid.
heterogeneous appliances by different manufacturers. In short,
key contributions of this paper include:
1) Design of the system architecture and clear functional
and technical specifications towards practically imple-
menting the dynamic energy management service in
smart grid. This includes the investigation of basic
requirements and features for the HEG, household ap-
pliances and the utility.
2) Design and development of the Universal Plug & Play
(UPnP) technology for overcoming interoperability and
integration issues as well as achieving two-way com-
mand and control features between the HEG and hetero-
geneous household appliances. This complex framework
consists:
• Design of UPnP based two-way command and con-
trol communication system architecture.
• Implementation of Simple Service Discovery Proto-
col (SSDP) for enabling auto-discovery and hassle-
free zero-configuration based networking between
the HEG and household appliances.
• Implementation of Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP) for sending and receiving commands.
• Implementation of General Event Notification Ar-
chitecture (GENA) for sending and receiving notifi-
cations/information about devices operational state.
3) A suitable methodology for tracking devices operational
state in a seamless manner. This includes development of
a Power State Monitoring (PSM) module for seamlessly
monitoring operational status of appliances from the
kernel and keeping the HEG updated.
4) Design and implementation of elliptic curve based se-
curity mechanism to protect privacies of consumers and
shield against different types of cyber-attacks.
5) Functional and performance evaluation of proposed sys-
tem in real networking environment.
C. Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents pre-
vious works from literature. Section III presents an overview
of the proposed system and design challenges. Section IV
presents design and characteristics of proposed communication
framework. Section V describes the implementations. Analysis
of the security mechanism is provided in section VI. Section
VII practically evaluates the proposed system in real network-
ing environment. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Dynamic energy management is an important factor rev-
olutionizing traditional grids into smart grids. Yao in [14]
proposed a residential load management mechanism by using
Photo-Voltaic (PV) cells installed on the rooftop. It schedules
the operation of deferrable household appliances from peak-
hours to off-peak hours and maximizes the use of local
generated electricity from PV units. The excess electricity
from PV units is contributed to the main grid. Gomez in [5]
proposed a mechanism to forecast load and manage building
heating/cooling appliances accordingly. It ensures customer
satisfaction by maintaining comfortable building temperature
while also helps grid to meet demand-response requirements.
Several researchers have investigated load scheduling mech-
anisms for dynamic energy management in smart grid [15],
[16], [17]. Khoury in [17] proposed a methodology to optimize
energy storage under intermittent of electricity from the grid.
It uses predictive scheduling to ensure continuous supply of
electricity for critical household appliances.
The HEG (or gateway in general) is required at each
consumer site for dynamic energy management service. The
Open Service Gateway initiative (OSGi) alliance played an
important role in the modular design of home gateways [18].
Several researchers have adopted the concept and developed
modular gateways [8], [19], [20]. Bolla in [8] used HTTP
client-server model and presented software architecture. How-
ever, presented work lacks system requirements/specifications
and does not address interoperability/integration and security
issues. Whereas, [19] focused on the gateway components
but did not address communication aspects. Verba in [20]
addressed interoperability for Internet of Things (IoT) devices
but lacked plug & play, auto-discovery and security features.
Several researchers have developed gateways for energy
management using MQTT protocol due to its small footprint
and low bandwidth requirement [7], [11]. Lee in [7] proposed
a mechanism for scheduling the operation of devices based
on home energy consumption data received in the cloud.
Presented work is very brief and does not include detailed
technical specifications. Furthermore, proposed gateway lacks
auto-discovery, zero-configuration and security features. Al-
ternative protocol options for gateway design are XMPP [10]
and CoAP [21]. XMPP provides interoperability to certain
extent but lacks auto-discovery and security features. CoAP
can operate over DTLS security but lacks its own built-in
security mechanism.
Security threats and consequences in case of a cyber-
attack have been identified by several researchers [22], [23],
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Fig. 2. Overview of proposed system.
[24]. Khan in [22] investigated different Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attack scenarios in which a smart grid service can be
compromised. Liang in [23] studied impact of data tampering
or false data injection on the control algorithms. Whereas, Yao
in [24] investigated stealthy cyber-attacks on smart metering
infrastructure network and identified potential theft of elec-
tricity if the communication is compromised. Most protocols
used in the HEG design lack security features. Thus, additional
security technologies must be incorporated.
Although, different protocols and gateway designs have
been studied by several researchers, literature works still lack
at-least one or more of the challenges addressed in Section I-A.
Thus, the objective of this paper is to investigate and develop a
comprehensive communication framework that provides auto-
discovery, zero-configuration based plug & play communica-
tion, interoperability, integration, privacy and security features.
III. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SYSTEM
The proposed system consists of utility, the HEG, household
appliances as shown in Fig. 2. Communication between the
HEG and household appliances is local while communication
between the HEG and utility passes over public Internet.
The complexity and challenges for both communication types
are different. Due to private LAN, there are no security
concerns for communication between the HEG and household
appliances. However, proper security measures are necessary
to protect privacies of consumers for communication between
the HEG and utility. Therefore, communication framework is
designed based on the requirements (as shown in Fig. 2) and
consists of UPnP technology and ECC-based secure HTTP.
The UPnP technology offers several interesting features
including hassle free zero configuration based networking
between the HEG and household appliances. It enables appli-
ances to seamlessly discover and communicate with the HEG
as soon as connected to the network. The keying material and
security policies for ECC-based secure HTTP communication
framework are refreshed periodically in order to achieve best
possible protection against cyber-attacks including cryptanal-
ysis. These security policies consists of signature algorithm,
key size, validity, authentication method, etc.
The HEG plays an important role in the design of distributed
dynamic energy management service in smart grid. For energy
management with better user satisfaction, the HEG can be
configured to control appliances based on: (i) energy price, (ii)
time frame, and (iii) operational importance of the appliance.
Thinking rational economically, consumers will schedule load
to off-peak hours (low energy price). Alternatively, consumers
may grant control of appliances to the utility that will remotely
control their operational state based on current load or energy
price. The control of appliances can also be based on their
operational importance e.g., heating is strictly necessary during
night in winter.
Basic requirements for proposed system can be classified
into three sections: (i) requirements for household appliances,
(ii) requirements for the HEG, and (iii) requirements for utility.
A. Requirements for Household Appliances
Appliances need to satisfy the following basic requirements:
• They should operate as plug & play for user convenience.
This includes seamless discovery and communication
with the HEG without requiring any configurations.
• They must support a common set of features to achieve
interoperability if manufactured by different companies.
• They should be able to operate in any network topology
(e.g., bus, ring, star, mesh or hybrid).
• Each appliance should have a unique identity. Due to pri-
vate IP addresses used in home networks, the Universally
Unique IDentifiers (UUID) is ideal choice for identity.
• They should be able to track changes in their operational
or power state and immediately notify the HEG.
• They should be able to update their operational state
based on the instructions received from the HEG.
• They should support network based wake-up or switch-
ing ON features (e.g., Wake-On-LAN (WOL), Wake-on-
Wireless-LAN (WoWLAN), etc).
• They should embed built-in intelligence and decide if
commands from the HEG are safe enough to execute,
otherwise ignore the commands.
B. Requirements for the HEG
The HEG needs to satisfy the following basic requirements:
• It should be easily accessible by utility and heterogeneous
household appliances supporting common protocol.
• It should keep track of the power/operational state and
capabilities of each appliance.
• It should be able to automate the use of household
appliances based on the instructions received from utility.
• It should be able to send commands to appliances e.g.,
operation on, operation off, go to standby, etc.
• It should be able to wake-up an appliance (e.g., WOL).
• It should implement a standard Firewall to prevent unau-
thorized access of adversaries to the local network.
• It should implement a security mechanism for protecting
communication with utility from cyber-attacks.
• It should have minimal resource requirements and com-
fortably operate on resource constraint gateway devices.
C. Requirements for Utility
The utility needs to satisfy the following basic requirements:
• It should keep track of each consumer site (number of
appliances, power consumptions, etc). Each consumer site
can be uniquely identified from the HEG’s UUID.
• It should implement a security mechanism for protecting
communication with consumer sites from cyber-attacks.
• It should provide current energy price and demand infor-
mation to the HEG at each consumer site.
• It should be able to control appliances through the HEG
(e.g., switch ON/OFF flexible appliances).
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Fig. 3. UPnP semantics between the HEG and household appliances.
IV. DESIGN OF COMMUNICATION FRAMEWORK
This section addresses proposed UPnP and ECC-based
secure HTTP communication framework (shown in Fig. 2).
A. UPnP Communication Architecture
The choice of UPnP technology for home network is
motivated for several reasons: (i) auto-discovery between
devices, (ii) zero-configuration based networking, (iii) it solves
interoperability and integration issues between appliances from
different manufacturers, (iv) it supports state variables and
eventing, and (v) it is easily supported on any network device.
UPnP technology enables HEG to seamlessly discover
available appliances, monitor their operation state and execute
commands on them (Fig. 3 depicts basic communication se-
mantics). As soon as an appliance is connected to the network,
it acquires an IP address using DHCP protocol. The next step
is discovery in which a device announces its presence in the
network and also discovers the presence of other UPnP devices
using SSDP protocol. After discovery, both the HEG and
appliances retrieve service descriptions (capabilities, actions,
commands, etc) of each other. With the knowledge of service
description, the HEG and household appliances can send and
receive control commands using SOAP protocol. When any
state variable of an appliance changes (e.g., power state), the
UPnP mechanism immediately notifies the HEG using GENA
protocol. Presentation is the last step in which description of
a UPnP device can be retrieved from its URL.
The UPnP device architecture [25] consists of two types
of devices: Control Point (CP) and Controlled Device (CD).
Functionalities of CP are similar to a client whereas, CD to
a server. In general, one device implements a CP (can only
send commands) and other device implements a CD (can only
receive commands). In proposed system, both the HEG and
household appliances implement a CP as well as a CD (to
achieve two-way command & control) as depicted in Fig. 4.
To achieve interoperability, a common UPnP service needs
to be implemented by household appliances (as shown in
Table I). It consists of state variables (i.e., WakeMethod,
PowerState, StartTime, StopTime, etc) and a list of actions
that the HEG can invoke on household appliances such as:
(i) GetPowerState: Provides current power state to the HEG,
Appliance
Controlled Device
Service:1
- Actions
- State variables
HEG
Control Point
Controlled Device
Service:1
- Actions
- State variables
Control Point
Fig. 4. Communication scenario between the HEG and household appliances.
(ii) WakeUpMethod: Provides information to the HEG about
supported wake-up method, (iii) OperationOn: The appliance
starts its operations, (iv) OperationOff : The appliance stops
its operations, (v) GoToStandby: The appliance goes to sleep-
/standby state, (vi) StandbyPeriod: The appliance will stay in
sleep state during specified start and stop period, and (vii)
Withdraw: Withdraws an action previously registered.
Similarly, the HEG also implements a UPnP service (as
shown in Table II). It consists of actions invokable by house-
hold appliances such as: (i) WakeUpTime: The HEG should
wake the appliance up at specified time, (ii) NoStandbyPeriod:
The HEG should avoid putting an appliance into sleep state
during the specified period, and (iii) Withdraw: Withdraws an
action previously registered.
B. ECC-based Secure HTTP Communication
The ECC-based secure HTTP can be most suitable choice
for communication between the HEG and utility due to: (i)
structured meta-data, (ii) HTTP flow is normally open through
Firewalls, and (iii) highest level of protection for confidential-
ity and integrity of communication with low computational
cost. Several features of ECC based security approach make
it ideal choice: (i) use of elliptic curve mechanism for estab-
lishing secret key over insecure network, (ii) use of sender
private key to assure non-repudiation (iii) computationally
efficient compared to Diffie Hellman [26], and (iv) suitable for
real-time communication. ECC-based secure communication
architecture consists of the following steps:
1) Key Generation Mechanism: The key generation pro-
cedure is shown in Algorithm 1. Before starting to generate
public/private key pair, HEG/Utility first selects an elliptic
curve EP (a, b). It then chooses a point on this elliptic curve
i.e., E1 and a random number R. This random number is an
additive factor that shows how many times E1 must be added
with itself to generate E2. HEG/Utility keeps this random
number secret as its private key and announces E1, E2 and
P as public key. Due to the discrete logarithmic problem and
modulus operation, it is not possible to guess/calculate the
value of R from E1 and E2. This is because, different values
of R result in same E2 for the value of E1. For example,
an elliptic curve with P = 13, E1 = 7 and R = 3 results
E2 = RE1 mod P = 8. If the value of R changes to R = 16,
it results again E2 = RE1 mod P = 8.
2) Secure Communication: For secure communication, a
message is first encrypted and then its hash (i.e., MAC) is
calculated. This approach helps the receiver to verify the
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ACTIONS PROVIDED BY UPNP POWER MANAGEMENT SERVICE OFFERED BY HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES. IN MEANS ‘PARAMETERS/VALUES SENT TO THE
RECEIVING DEVICE’ WHILE OUT MEANS ‘PARAMETERS/VALUES RETURNED BACK TO THE SENDER’.
Arguments UUID Address PowerState WakeMethod StartTime StopTime RegID
Allowed Values – IPv4/IPv6 ON/OFF/Standby WOL/WoWLAN HH:MM:SS HH:MM:SS Integer
A
ct
io
n
N
am
e
GetPowerState IN IN OUT - - - OUT
WakeUpMethod IN IN - OUT - - OUT
OperationOn IN IN - - - - OUT
OperationOff IN IN - - - - OUT
GoToStandby IN IN - - - - OUT
StandbyPeriod IN IN - - IN IN OUT
Withdraw IN IN - - - - IN
TABLE II
ACTIONS PROVIDED BY UPNP SERVICE OFFERED BY THE HEG. IN MEANS ‘PARAMETERS/VALUES SENT TO THE RECEIVING DEVICE’ WHILE OUT
MEANS ‘PARAMETERS/VALUES RETURNED BACK TO THE SENDER’.
Arguments UUID Address Time StartTime StopTime RegID
Allowed Values – IPv4/IPv6 HH:MM:SS HH:MM:SS HH:MM:SS Integer
A
ct
io
n
N
am
e WakeUpTime IN IN IN - - OUT
NoStandbyPeriod IN IN - IN IN OUT
Withdraw IN IN - - - IN
Algorithm 1 Key Generation
1: procedure
2: Select an elliptic curve EP (a, b)
3: Select a point E1 on EP (a, b)
4: Select a random number R
5: Calculate E2 = RE1 mod P
6: Keep R secret as private key
7: Make ( E1 , E2, EP (a, b)) public
8: end procedure
message first and then decrypt to save computational resources
(a fake/corrupted message is simply discarded without decryp-
tion). The proposed one-to-one secure communication model
works as follow:
• For the HEG to communicate with the Utility, it
requests the public key of Utility from the central Key
Management Center (KMC).
• HEG encrypts the message (M) using its own randomly
generated number (RHEG) and public key parameters of
Utility (EU1, EU2, EP ) where EU2 = RUtilityEU1 as
follow:
C1 = RHEGEU1 mod P (1)
C2 =M +RHEGEU2 mod P (2)
where C1 and C2 are the cipher text generated from
the message M using the utility public key parameters
E1, E2 and a random number RREG.
• Once the message is encrypted, HEG generates a MAC
from the encrypted message using a hashing function H
and signs it with its own private key RHEG as
MAC = {H(C1 + C2)}RHEG (3)
• HEG sends C1, C2 and MAC to Utility
HEG→ Utility : [C1 || C2 || MAC] (4)
• Utility creates MAC ′ from the received message. It also
decrypts the received MAC using the HEG public key
KHEG and compares it with the created MAC ′ as
MAC ′ = H(C1 + C2) (5)
MAC = {H(C1 + C2)RHEG}KHEG = H(C1 + C2)
(6)
• If received decrypted MAC is equal to new calculated
MAC ′, it accepts and decrypts the entire message as
M = C2 − (RUtility × C1)modP (7)
M =M +RHEGRUtilityEU1 −RUtilityRHEGEU1 mod P (8)
M =M (9)
otherwise it discards the message.
V. IMPLEMENTATIONS
The generic architecture of software entities for utility,
HEG and household appliances is shown in Fig. 5. The
Power System block in utility software (see Fig. 5(a)) is
presented in generic way and its functionalities are based
on the smart grid service. For dynamic energy management
service under consideration, Power System block provides
current energy price and demand information. The behavioral
rules are invoking different actions based on the information
received from Power System block (e.g., informs the HEG to
reduce load to certain threshold). The HTTP block implements
client and server for two-way communication with the HEG.
Communication security is achieved using ElGamal ECC.
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Fig. 5. Basic software structures in the proposed communication framework.
The functional blocks of the HEG software are shown in
Fig. 5(b). It embeds a UPnP CP as well as a CD for two
way communication with household appliances. The CP is
used for sending commands whereas CD receives commands
from household appliances. The Utility Client is used for
communication with utility and provides it access to the local
implementation of energy management service.
The functional blocks of the software for household ap-
pliances are shown in Fig. 5(c). Similarly to the HEG, it
also embeds a UPnP CP as well as a CD for two way
communication with the HEG. It implements all of the actions
specified in Section IV. The home appliance also implements a
PSM kernel module. The PSM module continuously monitors
all changes in the operation or power state (e.g., switch ON,
switch OFF, sleep state, etc) of the device and immediately
notifies the HEG over UPnP communication framework.
All three software entities in Fig. 5 were implemented using
C/C++ programming language in the Linux operating system.
The libupnp libraries were used for the implementation of
UPnP communication framework. For ease in implementation
of network tasks, boost libraries were used.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To validate the security features, first we describe the
adversary/threat model to highlight the attacker’s capabilities.
Then the proposed security mechanism is analyzed against
various attacks based on the attacker capabilities.
A. Adversary Model
We consider an adversary with the following capabilities: (i)
it has full access to the network communications, and (ii) it can
listen, capture, store, modify, replay, delay and drop messages
(packets). The different types of attacks that we consider in this
article are the threats to information/key messages exchanged
between two devices.
B. Security Attacks
Messages must be secured from the understanding, modi-
fication and replication by an attacker. Such types of attacks
are called communication-based attacks and they include:
1) Sybil Attacks: In this type of attack, attacker creates
multiple fake nodes that carry the authentic node IDs. But
these fake nodes have only the public keys of authentic nodes
and have no information regarding the private keys. Once these
fake nodes receive the messages that are encrypted by public
keys, they cannot decrypt it. This is because, they need private
keys for decrption. But private keys are only known to the
authentic devices and only the authentic devices are able to
respond to the message. In the proposed framework, HEG
uses the public private key approach, hence an attacker cannot
succeed by creating fake HEGs as these fake HEGs will not
be able to decrypt and respond to correct queries.
2) Man in the Middle Attack: As the name implies, in
these attacks the attacker manages to intercept all exchanges
between two communicating parties without revealing its real
identity to either of them. Hence, in order to succeed, the at-
tacker needs to successfully impersonate each communicating
party in the session. However, in our framework each device
is authenticated based on their public private key pair which
prevents its impersonation. For example, if an attacker wants
to impersonate an authentic device during the communication
between KMC and HEG, the attacker cannot sign a hash
generated for each message using the authentic HEG/KMC
private key. This is because the private key is only known to
the authentic HEGs/KMC.
3) Authentication Attacks: During the authentication phase,
sender uses its own public/private key pair and receiver public
key to verify and authenticate each other. To do so, sender
creates the hash of a message and sings it by its own private
key. Sender encrypts the message along with its signed hash
using receiver public key and send it to the receiver. Receiver
upon receiving the message, it decrypts the message using
its own private key to extract the message and signed hash.
Receiver decrypts the signed hash using the sender public
key. Receiver also generates another hash from the received
message and compare it with the received signed hash. If
both are equal, message is accepted otherwise rejected. In the
propose framework, HEGs use their private keys to sign and
encrypt the hash and public keys of the receiver to encrypt the
message (i.e. C1 and C2). If attacker tries to authenticate it
self to the HEG, HEG is not the able to decrypt the messages
because HEG is not able to get the public key of attacker from
the KMC which registers all HEGs public keys with itself.
This fails the authentication between HEG and an attacker
7TABLE III
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF HTTP-BASED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
UTILITY AND THE HEG.
Without security With security
C
IA
M
od
el Confidentiality None Strong
Integrity None Strong
Availability Vulnerable Vulnerable
A
tta
ck
Ty
pe
Reconnaissance Vulnerable Protected
Authentication/Access Vulnerable Protected
Man In The Middle (MITM) Vulnerable Protected
Replay / Reflection Vulnerable Protected
Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerable Vulnerable
and protects the system from outsiders.
4) Replay attacks: These are implemented by resending at
a later time some messages recorded from a previous legiti-
mate message exchange, in order to gain access to protected
resources or to privileges. Proposed framework prevents this
type of attacks by using timestamping each message and then
checking for its freshness. If a message is received within the
time frame specified in packet, it is accepted otherwise rejected
as this could be a replayed or delayed message.
Proposed elliptic curve based secure HTTP communication
uses encryption to achieve protection against reconnaissance.
Authentication attacks can also be prevented as the adversary
cannot get access to security credentials. Without knowledge
of keying material and security policies, eavesdropping on
network traffic cannot be possible. Absolute protection against
DoS attack is impossible for any security mechanism, however,
proposed approach can significantly reduce its impact by using
MAC verification step first. The cookie helps recipient easily
detect DoS and discards packet without processing (saves
memory and CPU resources). The effectiveness of proposed
system is summarized in Table III.
VII. EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The testbed for experimental evaluation consists of a utility
communicating with different consumer sites as depicted in
Fig. 6. The HEG software is executed on a low power pocket
PC i.e., Raspberry Pi v2 (ARMv6 700 MHz, 512 MB). This
prevents any incremental energy waste as Raspberry Pi has
full load power consumption of just 3.8 W. A standard PC is
considered as a typical home appliance due to unavailability of
networking features on legacy household appliances. However,
it is expected that heaters, TV, lightening, refrigerators, air
conditioners and other household appliance will sooner or later
become part of the network.
The first step in experimental evaluation is the functional
verification of all three software entities in Fig. 5. The
UPnP communication architecture was efficient and devices
seamlessly discovered each other as soon as connected to the
network. All UPnP actions reported in Table I and Table II
were successfully verified. The PSM kernel module was also
reliably tracking changes in the appliance operational status.
The HEG was able to alter remotely the operational state
of household appliances whenever necessary (i.e., triggering
built-in OS calls). The WOL feature that enables the HEG to
remotely wake-up an appliance was also correctly verified.
            Utility 
Network 
Utility 
Home Network 
HEG 
Raspberry Pi 
INTERNET 
Appliance 
Home Network 
HEG 
Raspberry Pi 
Appliance 
Utility 
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Consumer  
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Fig. 6. Experimental Testbed.
The next step in evaluation is the analysis of different
performance factors which may can impair the real-time
operations. The following subsections analyzes critical factors
such as latencies, resource requirements, overhead, etc.
A. Communication Overhead
Communication overhead is a critical factor that can affect
throughput and real-time operations for any communication
framework. It is also a factor determining the required link
bandwidth. High overhead leads to slower throughput on low
bandwidth links. For overhead analysis, we considered each
individual UPnP event such as discovery, invoking actions,
notification of state changes and de-registration. The total
experiment duration was 12 minutes during which a sequence
of activities take place (i.e., appliance registers with the HEG,
HEG remotely alters power state of the appliance, HEG
remotely wakes up the appliance, HEG de-registers with the
appliance). The overhead in terms of total number of packets
exchanged is shown in Fig. 7(a). The majority of packets were
exchanged during steady state which are periodic presence
advertisements with smallest average packet size. The average
packet size during discovery and de-registration is big due
to carrying complete UPnP device and service descriptions.
The average packet size during power state notification is
very small. Further, notification messages are very infrequent.
For more clarity, Fig. 7(b) depicts the total number of Bytes
exchanged during different events which is linked directly with
the average packet size and packets transmission rate.
Fig. 7(c) provides more detailed overhead information by
classifying packet content into real information, overhead
Bytes due to UPnP formatting, overhead Bytes due to headers
and total communication semantics overhead. It is obvious that
real information in packets is high during registration and de-
registration phases due to downloading of UPnP device and
service descriptions. The percentage of real information is very
low during action registration and state variable update. Thus,
it can be concluded that small size packet are frequent and
large size packets are rarely exchanged based on event types.
Even though, the percentage of overhead Bytes in each packet
is high, it does not affect reliability due to small size packets.
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Fig. 7. UPnP overhead analysis in proposed framework.
B. Resource Requirements
The resource requirements were analyzed in terms of CPU,
memory and bandwidth. The CPU usage was always less than
10 % even on low power PC, the Raspberry Pi. This is due
to the fact that no much CPU intensive tasks are involved in
the proposed system. The memory requirement can be more
critical for HEG as the legacy gateway devices are equipped
with 16 MB or 32 MB. However, the observed memory
requirement was very low (as reported in Table IV) which
makes HEG easily portable to any legacy gateway device.
Comparing to utility and home appliances, the HEG memory
requirement is slightly higher due to the implementation of
both, ECC based security mechanism and UPnP communica-
tion framework. The memory requirement for utility software
TABLE IV
MEMORY REQUIREMENT OF DEVELOPED SOFTWARE ENTITIES.
Utility Software HEG Software Appliance Software
2.98 MB 4.87 MB 4.53 MB
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Fig. 8. The HEG memory requirement vs number of registered appliances.
is very low due to implementation of basic set of features.
However, implementation of more complex utility software
could slightly increase the memory requirements.
Note that Table IV presents memory requirement for the
HEG with a single registered home appliance. The resource
requirement for the HEG will increase with the increase in
the number of registered appliances. In a realistic scenario,
the HEG will be simultaneously managing several home ap-
pliances. Fig. 8 analyzes the memory requirement for the HEG
with increase in the number of registered home appliances. It
can be observed that the memory requirement is lower than 8
MB even with 160 registered appliances (much higher number
than in a realistic home scenario). Table V presents memory
requirement for the HEG software for each additional home
appliance. Each appliance on average requires 17.86 KB of
additional memory at the HEG. Due to very low memory
requirement, the HEG software on a legacy gateway device
can easily manage hundreds of home appliances.
For the HEG to manage large number of appliances, the
volume of network traffic will also increase. This leads to
additional computation and increases the CPU requirement
for the HEG. It is a critical factor that could potentially limit
the HEG scalability for managing large number of appliances
(depending on the specific hardware platform). To analyze
the robustness and scalability of the HEG, a high volume of
network traffic has been generated at the HEG. Fig. 9 depicts
the CPU usage under varying network traffic load. It can be
observed that even on a low power PC (i.e., Raspberry Pi), the
CPU usage is always less than 30 % even at high volume of
network traffic. The concludes that the HEG is scalable and
suitable to be deployed on legacy gateway devices.
The bandwidth requirement is very critical for any net-
work protocol. Low available link bandwidth than requirement
can cause traffic congestion and packet loss. The bandwidth
requirement for developed communication framework is re-
ported in Table VI for a single registered device/appliance.
9TABLE V
ADDITIONAL REQUIRED MEMORY PER DEVICE/APPLIANCE FOR THE HEG.
THE RESULTS ARE AVERAGED OVER 100 TRIALS.
Min (KB) Avg (KB) Max (KB) Mean Dev (KB)
14.62 17.86 20.14 0.837
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Fig. 9. The HEG CPU usage under varying network traffic load.
Bandwidth requirement also depends on the number of regis-
tered appliances and ideally will scale linearly. Fig. 10 depicts
the minimum required bandwidth versus increasing number
of registered appliances. Due to higher overhead, bandwidth
requirement for UPnP communication framework is slightly
higher compared to HTTP protocol. However, the requirement
is significantly lower than the supported data rate by most of
the access technologies (e.g., ADSL Lite: 1.5 Mbps, wireless
802.11b: 11 Mbps, etc). Even for 100 registered appliances,
bandwidth requirement is less than 150 kbps. Due to very low
resource requirements, smooth and reliable operations can be
easily achieved on today’s access technologies.
C. Communication Latencies
Latencies can leave adverse impact on the operations of real-
time applications. In experiments, latencies were classified into
two types: communication latencies and processing latencies.
Low communication latencies are very important for reliable
operations and depends on the available bandwidth. It is
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Fig. 10. Bandwidth requirement vs number of registered appliances.
TABLE VI
BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENT FOR DEVELOPED COMMUNICATION
FRAMEWORK.
UPnP Communication HTTP Communication
1.48 kbps 0.41 kbps
TABLE VII
COMMUNICATION LATENCIES ANALYSIS.
UPnP Communication HTTP Communication
96.33 ms 1.26 sec
necessary that power state notifications should be transfered
with shortest possible delay due to gap of only 1-2 seconds
between kernel notification and actual change in device power
state. Further, updates on security polices should be received
by the HEG with lowest possible delay before the expiry of
old credentials. Table VII reports observed communication
latencies for developed communication framework. It can be
observed that UPnP communication latency is very low and
does not leave any adverse impact on the operations. However,
the reported HTTP communication latency is slightly high due
to use of external third party DNS service (i.e., NO-IP DNS)
in experiments. The latency can be significantly reduced by
designing a private DNS service.
Processing latencies of developed software entities depend
significantly on the ECC-based encryption and signature al-
gorithm. Fig. 11 depicts the elliptic curve based encryption
latencies with increasing message size. The latencies are
significantly low even for large messages. Similarly, measured
latencies for signature calculation are also very low as depicted
in Fig. 12. Thus, processing latencies of software entities are
always less than 20 ms and does not leave any negative impact
on the operations.
The computational requirement for the HEG will increase
with the increase in the number of registered appliances
which might affect the processing latencies. To analyze a
realistic scenario, communication and processing latencies
for the HEG have been observed in Fig. 13 for increasing
number of registered appliances. For clarity, latencies have
been measured for different stages of UPnP communication
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semantics. It can be observed in Fig. 13 that increase in the
number of household appliances has negligible impact on the
observed latencies. Even for 160 appliances (much higher
number than a realistic home scenario), UPnP latencies are
less than 100 ms on a low power Raspberry Pi. Fig. 14 depicts
the average processing latency of the HEG for commands
received from the utility. Note, Fig. 14 does not consider
the HTTP communication latency as it depends on the access
technology used by the customers. It can be observed in Fig.
14 that the HEG processing latency is less than 20 ms for
commands received from the utility even with 160 registered
household appliances. Due to low processing requirement,
HEG is scalable and can easily offer service for hundreds of
household appliances even on low power gateway devices.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic energy management has several benefits for con-
sumers as well as power grids. Cutting off un-necessary loads
or scheduling them from peak demand hours to off-peak
hours not only eases pressure on power grids but also offers
economic benefits to consumers. Several researchers have
proposed an intelligent device at consumer sites (i.e., the HEG)
and addressed specific challenges such as auto-discovery [8],
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Fig. 14. Average HEG processing latency for commands received from the
utility with increasing number of registered appliances.
[9], interoperability [7], [9], [10], [11] or security [12], [13].
However, published works lack a comprehensive communica-
tion framework design that could address these challenges all
together.
This paper proposed a comprehensive communication
framework based on the UPnP technology that provides auto-
discovery, zero-configuration based plug & play networking,
interoperability, integration, privacy and security features. In
particular, basic requirements and key challenges have been
identified for the utility, HEG and household appliances in the
design of distributed dynamic energy management service in
smart grid. This paper proposed a communication framework
that uses UPnP technology for local communication between
the HEG and household appliances whereas, ECC based
secure HTTP protocol for communication between the HEG
and utility. The use of UPnP technology provides numerous
benefits including hassle free seamless networking with zero-
configuration, auto-discovery, interoperability and integration
between the HEG and heterogeneous household appliances.
Experiments in real networking environment verified the func-
tionalities, suitability and effectiveness of the developed UPnP
communication architecture for dynamic energy management
in smart grid.
This paper also presented an effective security mechanism
based on elliptic curve approach for protecting communication
between the HEG and utility against different types of cyber-
attacks. It is experimentally validated that the proposed com-
munication framework is lightweight, secure, portable with
low bandwidth requirement and flexible enough to be adopted
for any emerging smart grid service involving consumers. This
will enable rapid adoption of new smart grid control and mon-
itoring applications with increased consumers participation,
reduced risk of blackout/load-shedding and reliable low-cost
supply of electricity.
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